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N Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) a review is provided for parties challenging final antidump-
ing or countervailing duty determinations.' Specifically, under Arti-
cle 1904(2) these parties have the option of bringing appeals before an
independent NAFTA Binational Panel (Panel) instead of the national
courts of the importing country.2 By applying the "statutes, legislative
history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents" of
that country, the Panel decides whether the disputed determinations were
made in accordance with the antidumping and countervailing duty laws of
the determining country.3 This article summarizes the Panel's review and
decision with respect to a challenge that occurred between August 2008
and October 2008.
II. IN THE MATTER OF STAINLESS STEEL SHEET AND
STRIP COILS FROM MEXICO:
The Panel's decision is derived from a dumping determination by the
United States Commerce Department on June 8, 1991, regarding stainless
steel sheet and strip ("SSSS").4 Then in 1999, the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (Commission) made the determination that
"revocation of the antidumping order on stainless steel sheet and strip...
from Mexico would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of
material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably
foreseeable time."' 5 This Binational Panel was then formed to review this
determination after Thyssenn Krupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V. and Mexinox
USA Inc. (collectively, Mexinox) asserted its right to request a Panel Re-




4. Article 1904 Binational Panel Review, Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from
Mexico: U.S. International Trade Commission Final Affirmative Determination in
the Five Year Review of the Antidumping Order, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-
2005-2903-06 (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/
DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?Detaill D=380 [hereinafter Panel Review].
5. Id. at 4.
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view of this determination. 6 The Panel ultimately concluded that the va-
rious arguments set forth by Mexinox and the supporting evidence "[did]
not directly contradict or undercut the specific elements of evidence cited
by the Commission in support of its findings in the review" and upheld
the conclusion of the Commission. 7
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW USED BY THE PANEL
The Panel conducted the review of the decision by the Commission
under a substantial evidence standard of review, meaning that the deter-
mination must be affirmed unless it cannot be "supported by substantial
evidence on the record."'8 The fact that two inconsistent conclusions
could be drawn from the evidence does not mean that the conclusion is
not supported by substantial evidence.9 The Commission is supposed to
scrutinize this conflicting evidence in order to determine that the imports
are actually causing injury and not merely "'contributing to the injury in a
tangential or minimal way.'" ' 10 Additionally, the Panel reviewed the
Commission's decisions to determine whether they were "in accordance
with [the] law.""a
B. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE PANEL
The Panel's decision was based on a review of seven issues: (1) discern-
able adverse impact, (2) imports likely to compete-fungibility, (3) exer-
cise of discretion to cumulate, (4) conditions of competition, (5) volume
of imports, (6) price effects, and (7) impact of subject imports. 12
1. Discernable Adverse Impact
The Panel determined that "the Commission's determination that sub-
ject imports from Mexico would not be likely to have no discernible ad-
verse impact on the domestic SSSS industry within a reasonably
foreseeable time" was supported under the substantial evidence standard
and was in accordance with the law. 13 Mexinox argued (1) that the Com-
mission did not correctly calculate the available capacity of the company;
(2) there were limits on the ability to increase production; (3) there "was
no link between its capacity utilization and its level of exports to the
United States"; and (4) the increase in production attributed to its excess
capacity would still only be a "small percentage of the [entire] U.S. do-
6. Id. This timely request for a Panel Review is provided for by Rule 34 of the North
America Free Trade Agreement Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational
Panel Rules.
7. Id. at 46. The decision of the Commission was published on July 18, 2005, at 70
Fed. Reg. 41236.
8. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 10.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 11 (quoting Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
266 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12-14.
13. ld. at 12, 20.
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mestic market." 14 The Commission argued against all of the assertions
made by Mexinox. 15
The panel concluded that the "record indicate[d] that Mexinox was a
dominant supplier of SSSS to the U.S. market and that the domestic mar-
ket accounted for a substantial portion of the company's sales and reve-
nues." 16 Additionally, the Panel determined that Mexinox would be able
to increase exports into the United States by utilizing its current unused
capacity. 17 Among other things, the Panel also agreed with the assertion
that "Mexinox carried on significant price underselling during the period
of review" and that this underselling continued after the order. 18 The
Panel believes the events that took place during the period of the review
should also be considered, and even if the circumstances did not change
during this time period, there was still substantial evidence to sustain the
determinations of the Commission. 19 Because of its findings, "[t]he Panel
conclude[d] that the Commission's determination that subject imports
from Mexico would not be likely to have no discernible adverse impact if
the order [was] revoked is supported by substantial evidence... and... in
accordance with law." 20
2. Imports Likely to Compete-Fungibility
"The Tariff Act [of 1930 (Tariff Act)] provides that 'the Commission
may cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports ... if such im-
ports would be likely to compete with each other and with the [U.S. do-
mestic products].' ' '21 While there are four sub-factors that the
Commission normally considers to determine whether imports are likely
to compete with each other, the only one Mexinox challenged was the
Commission's decision regarding "the degree of fungibility between the
imports from different countries and between imports and the domestic
like product" sub-factor. 22
Generally, Mexinox asserted that the "Commission focused on grade
alone, rather than differentiating factors. ' 23 For example, Mexinox ar-
gued that the Commission did not give due consideration to other factors
it deemed significant, which "differentiated the Mexican product from
that produced by other foreign suppliers and domestic producers. ' 24 It
also argued that responses to questionnaires from different purchasers in
the United States indicated that the products were not always inter-
changeable, but rather, the majority indicated the "imports from Mexico
14. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 15.
15. Id. at 16-19.
16. Id. at 19.




21. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 20-21 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(7) (2008)).
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id.
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were only sometimes or never interchangeable. ' 25
The Commission ultimately decided that the domestic and import
products were generally substitutable and that a majority of the purchas-
ers actually reported in the questionnaires that the "imports from Mexico
were always or frequently interchangeable with subject imports from the
other seven subject countries. ' 26 Also, quarterly price comparisons indi-
cated that the SSSS was competing with the imports from Mexico. 27 Fi-
nally, the Commission asserted that it did not need to investigate
Mexinox's specialized products because "the record demonstrated that
the company competed with a wide range of SSSS in the domestic
market." 28
Ultimately, the Panel concluded that there was a "fungibility of the
subject merchandise and domestic SSSS," which was proved by both the
questionnaire responses and "sales comparisons of commodity prod-
ucts." '29 The conclusion "that the subject imports would be likely to com-
pete with each other and with the domestic like product [was] supported
by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with
law. "30
3. Exercise of Discretion to Cumulate
Under the Tariff Act, the Commission is permitted to decide whether
or not to "cumulatively assess the volume and effect of subject imports
from all countries .... [Even if] "there is a likelihood of discernible ad-
verse effect and [if] the subject imports would be likely to compete with
each other and with domestic [products]. ' 31 Mexinox argued that the
Commission exercised its discretion to accumulate the imports based on
the premise that these imports from Mexico and the subject imports from
other countries would compete, which was incorrect.32 In addition to
stressing the difference in Mexinox's distribution system from the other
producers, Mexinox asserted that its pricing policies were based on for-
mulas from U.S. producers, unlike the other countries who were not
North American producers.33 Finally, Mexinox argued that ThyssenKrup
had its subsidiaries serve the regional markets, which meant "Mexinox
[was to] focus on the North American market [while] the European sub-
sidiaries would focus on [serving the] European market." 34
First, the Commission reiterated the fact that the decision whether to
cumulate is discretionary and this discretion is not limited under the
25. Id.
26. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 23-24.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 25.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 25-26.
32. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 26.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 27.
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Tariff Act. 35 The Commission argued that it properly exercised its discre-
tion because the record showed that imports from countries other than
the United Kingdom and France increased between 1996-1998 or 1997-
1998, and the domestic products were undersold by these countries in at
least one half of the price comparisons. 36 Additionally, "[t]he Commis-
sion argues that it does not need to rely on any particular factors .... [it]
has a wide latitude in determining how and where to exercise its discre-
tion to cumulate. ' 37 In response to Mexinox's argument regarding com-
mon ownership by ThyssenKrupp, the Commission points to the
testimony by the Chief Executive for ThyssenKrupp who said "the three
companies [were] closely coordinated," and therefore the Commission
treated them as one unit. 38 Because of this broad "latitude provided the
agency in the Tariff Act to exercise discretion" when deciding whether to
cumulate, the Panel determined that the decision to cumulate was "sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record and [was] otherwise in ac-
cordance with law." 39
4. Conditions of Competition
When the Commission is attempting to determine "whether [a] mate-
rial injury is likely to continue", the Tariff Act requires the Commission
to view the "economic factors 'within the context of the business cycle
and conditions of competition that are distinctive to the affected indus-
try." 40 The conditions of competition during the period of review re-
mained mostly the same as during the original period of investigation.41
There was an increase in demand during both periods, there was sub-
stitutability between the domestic SSSS and imports, and price was one of
the "most important factors in purchasing decisions. ' 42
Mexinox again asserted its contention that the determination by the
Commission on "fungibility and overlap of competition was" incorrect.43
Additionally, Mexinox disputed the Commission's determination that
SSSS capacity will grow faster than its global consumption under the sub-
stantial evidence standard because this information came from only one
source.44 The Commission argued that its conclusion was founded on
"the fact that commodity grade SSSS accounted for a significant portion
of domestic production as well as the majority of subject imports. ' 45 Ad-
ditionally, the Commission supported its findings on global capacity and
consumption by asserting that the actual information that it used in mak-
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 30.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(4) (2000)).
41. Id. at 31.
42. Id. at 32.
43. Id.
44. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 32.
45. Id.
2009]
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ing that determination was thought to be an "appropriate data source" by
Mexinox. 46 Finally, the Commission pointed to the fact that a "reasona-
bly foreseeable time" would not be the same in every situation and that
this time frame would likely be longer than the injury analysis time
frame. 47 Ultimately, the Panel concluded that the Commission's determi-
nation was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law
because there was "evidence of substitutability, the likelihood that global
capacity would increase at a greater rate than global consumption, and
* . .[the] time frame was sufficiently imminent. '48
5. Volume of Imports
The Commission determined that "the likely volume of imports of the
subject merchandise would be significant if the order was revoked. '49
While Mexinox argued that the Commission was incorrect in its conclu-
sion that there was excess capacity in Japan and Taiwan because of erro-
neous information, the Commission countered with the argument it was
only required to use that the information it used was "reasonable to use
under the circumstances. '50 This information did show that producers in
Japan and Taiwan were not operating at full capacity and that production
was increasing in Japan. 51
Additionally, Mexinox disputed the Commission's determination "that
subject producers have an incentive to increase exports to the United
States," which was based on three reasons: (1) the United States was an
attractive market because of "relative global prices," (2) the increase in
global production of SSSS would be outpaced by the increased capacity,
and (3) the producers could "shift production from cut-to-length ("CTL")
SSSS to coiled SSS.''52 Mexinox argued that the Commission viewed the
price analysis based on only one product, but the Commission asserted
that it "characterized the relative prices as mixed" and based on these
comparisons, there was an incentive to shift sales to the United States.5 3
The Commission also rebutted Mexinox's claims that increased capacity
for SSSS was based on speculation by pointing to "ample evidence in the
record," which indicated an increase.54 Finally, Mexinox argued that the
shift towards CTL had already been occurring and that this shift was due
to U.S. industry abandoning this product section.55 Although the shift
had begun before the orders, the Commission believed the agency's find-
ings are supported because of the "ease of switching to coiled SSSS, and
46. Id. at 33.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 34-36.
51. Id. at 36-37.
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 35-36.
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the desirability of the U.S. market." 56 The Commission also pointed out
that Mexinox's assertions regarding the U.S. abandonment were not
based on "any cited data." 57
The Panel upheld the Commission's determination after concluding
that there was sufficient evidence indicating "increased production in sev-
eral subject countries, price incentives to shift sales to the United States,
growth of capacity in China, and potential for shifting from CTL to coiled
SSSS."58
6. Price Effects
The Commission determined that the "likely price effects of the cumu-
lated subject merchandise would be significant if the order is revoked. 59
Mexinox argued against this by claiming there was a lack of evidence
showing that it could "'undersell or otherwise adversely affect U.S. prices"
because the testimony offered did not reveal an intention of the company
to change its pricing policy. 60 Additionally, Mexinox claimed that even in
light of the increases in volume and market share, domestic prices in-
creased and that the record showed there was an increasing demand in
the U.S. market, which would support the increased imports without af-
fecting prices. 61
The Commission disputed Mexinox's claims by reiterating the findings
of the original investigation: that "underselling occurred in almost two-
thirds of the price comparisons" and persisted for 41 percent of the com-
parisons completed during the review.62 The Commission also noted that
the Chief Executive of Mexinox stated that they had to alter their philos-
ophy in order to comply with the antidumping laws. 63 Furthermore, the
Commission took into account the increase in demand but determined
that this would not continue in light of the fact that the forecast after 2004
suggested that growth would be modest or slow, imports could be substi-
tuted for domestic SSSS, price continued to be crucial in purchasing, and
even after the antidumping orders, the practice of underselling contin-
ued.64 The Panel agreed with these assertions by the Commission, there-
fore, it concluded that "the Commission's determination that the likely
price effects of cumulated subject imports would be significant if the an-
tidumping... [orders] were revoked [was again] supported by substantial
evidence ... and ... in accordance with law."'65
56. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 38.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 39.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 40.
62. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 40-41.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id. at 41-42.
65. Id. at 42.
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7. Impact of Subject Imports
Finally, the Commission determined that the cumulated imports
"would lead to a continuation or recurrence of material injury if the an-
tidumping orders.., were revoked. '66 Mexinox argues that the Commis-
sion needed to meet a "higher burden to fully articulate its reasons for
reaching its finding," which it did not do. 67 It further asserts that the
determinations regarding volume and price effects were not supported by
"substantial evidence on the record. '68 Mexinox pointed to the year 2004
when the cost of goods was increasing at a slower rate than the prices,
and "that prices [were] expected to remain strong."'69 Mexinox believed
the Commission ignored this evidence and failed to support its assertion
that the increase in consumption would not be great enough to support
the increase in imports that would follow the revocation of the orders.70
The Commission points to the Tariff Act, which allows the agency to
consider different factors, but does not require that all of the factors be
met in order for the Commission to decide in the affirmative. 71 First, the
Commission asserts that the increasing imports caused the domestic in-
dustry to reduce its prices. 72 While the Commission determined that
there was "positive performance" in 2004, it also determined that this
would not be the case in 2005. 73 Additionally, the Commission explained
that it cited to "numerous forecasts and other evidence in the record in
support of its findings." 74 Ultimately, the Panel agreed with the Commis-
sion's determination that, among other things, the domestic industry had
to lower prices because of increasing exports, there were negative trends
in 1999-2000, and the forecast only indicated modest growth.75 There-
fore, the "likely impact of the cumulated subject imports would lead to
the continuation or recurrence of material injury" if the order was
removed. 76
III. CONCLUSION
Regarding the seven issues raised by Mexinox, the Panel determined
that the evidence in the record "[did] not directly contradict or undercut
the ... evidence cited by the Commission. '77 The fact that two inconsis-
tent conclusions could be drawn from the evidence presented by the two
sides did not mean that a decision was not supported by substantial evi-
66. Id. at 43.
67. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 43.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 43-44.
71. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)-(5).
72. Panel Review, supra note 4, at 44.
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id. at 45-46.
75. Id. at 46.
76. Id.
77. Id.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NAFTA
dence. 78 While the evidence presented by Mexinox does support a differ-
ent outcome, the Panel found that the Commission's conclusion was
"supported by substantial evidence on the record. ' 79
78. Id. at 46-47.
79. Id. at 47.
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